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ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW

Interview with Mr. J. J. McCardle

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Relations with National Defence at the working level were good. External Affairs was able to keep up with subjects because of its contacts in Defence. McCardle always got the information he needed to brief his superiors fully for their conversations with more senior personnel in Defence. Members of that department willingly gave the information McCardle required.

Foulkes

[REDACTED]

He had little patience with inter-governmental agreements because he felt that they never got completed.

Foulkes felt that Canada had little real autonomy in defence policy. For that reason, he had rejected an idea of Ignatieff's that there should be a paper on long-term defence policy (to go with a series of papers on external relations). He said he wanted to have working relationships with the US which forced the military in that country to consult. He felt that Canada must be an important cog in joint machinery. NORAD was such an instrument and for that reason he wanted to get it through.

External Affairs wanted NORAD to come to cabinet because they felt that if it did they would win on the need for inter-governmental agreement and civilian control. Foulkes

[REDACTED] and circumstances on the change of government

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suited him, although it cannot necessarily be assumed that he expected that Diefenbaker's approval would come as quickly as it did. But although Foulkes was able to recognize political opportunity and exploit it, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Thus he did not foresee the possibility that the government would be embarrassed by approval of NORAD without provision for civilian control. When that happened, Foulkes lost ground and had to change course and accept the need for intergovernmental agreement. Thus, in the longer term External Affairs benefited. National Defence dropped the fat in the fire and External Affairs pulled it out.

McCardle was surprised when he learned that the agreement had been approved, but not by its contents, since he had been closely involved in inter-departmental discussions. He feels Roy's biography of Pearkes [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Pearson had no need for privileged information, since he had been briefed just before the PC's took over, for the last cabinet defence committee meeting of the outgoing government. External Affairs was deliberate in writing to Miller rather than to Foulkes after it learned of Diefenbaker's action since it wanted to make it clear that what it was interested in was the Defence Minister's statement.

Green was [REDACTED] in the NATO context because of [REDACTED]. At a ministerial meeting when the Congo and other events in Africa were under discussion, [REDACTED] of the British for their policy in Africa. Home was scathing in

his response but Green did not seem concerned. On another occasion Green asked Léger, in a meeting with the officers of the Canadian mission, for an explanation of why Canada did not get out of NATO and do all its good works through the UN. Léger refused to deal with such an important question instantly but offered to provide a memo for the minister the next day. First of all, however, [REDACTED] Green was running a foreign policy [REDACTED] Léger [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] but Green [REDACTED]

Miller [REDACTED] Foulkes to the civilian bureaucracy, [REDACTED] Foulkes in defending the interests of the services. McCardle thought that Foulkes [REDACTED]

When he returned to Ottawa in 1962 as Head of DL2, McCardle [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. The esprit of the services, especially of the air force, however, was suffering by this time, because Canada had been priced out of the market for equipment (after the Arrow), and the problems resulting from integration.

Homosexuality and other forms of character weakness had been identified as security problems when Crean was head of DL2. Starnes had the biggest job in dealing with these. By the time McCardle became head of the division, a number of ground rules had been worked out by Robertson and Starnes. During McCardle's time, a plateau was reached, and then the problem declined to a manageable level. He thought [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] External Affairs had to be strict in dealing with these cases to protect itself but the application

of the cabinet directive was as humane as possible. Robertson and Cadieux both worried deeply about individual cases. McCardle's

[REDACTED] Sawatsky [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In fact, it had no alternative, since the rules had been laid down by cabinet. Homosexuality was not common to all cases of character weakness was that the suspected person was vulnerable to blackmail.

There is one small error in Granatstein's biography of Robertson affecting McCardle. He was one of the two intelligence officers who learned of the Cuban missile crisis at a meeting in Washington. He did not telephone the information to Ottawa as Granatstein says, but got in touch with Robertson after his return and briefed him personally. McCone, the Head of the CIA told McCardle and the heads of the other Commonwealth delegations at the Washington meeting that the missile sited had been identified. He asked McCardle not to inform his government, as separate arrangements were being made. But McCardle told him that in the Canadian system he could not make such an undertaking. After McCardle reported to Robertson and Bryce, the PM was informed, so that he had the information when he met Livingston Merchant in Ottawa.

The cabinet defence committee was briefed daily during the missile crisis. Diefenbaker arranged to be pre-briefed (in secret) so that he could ask knowledgeable questions in the defence committee. In the committee, Diefenbaker showed [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]