

~~SECRET~~  
July, 1972

PAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Security in the Public Service of Canada

Cabinet Directive No. 35

1. Security in the public service of Canada is essentially a part of good personnel administration, and therefore it is the responsibility of each department and agency. The security of classified information in the possession of a department or agency may be placed in jeopardy either by persons who may be disloyal to Canada and her system of government or by persons who are unreliable because of defects in their character.

*idbs  
nothing*

Revised Directive

1. Security in the public service is an essential part of good personnel administration and is, therefore, the responsibility of each department and agency. <sup>Information requiring</sup> ~~The security of~~ <sup>security protection \*</sup> classified information which is in the possession of a department or agency may be placed in jeopardy either by persons who are disloyal to Canada and her democratic system of government; by persons who seek the dissolution of Canada; by persons who seek to destroy the Canadian democratic process; or by persons who cannot be relied upon because of defects in their character.

\* Federal Soviet information classified <sup>Top Secret</sup> 'Secret', 'Confidential' or 'Restricted' & officially produced unclassified information whose unauthorized release could adversely affect the Soviet Union

*widened*

2. Employees in the public service of Canada, including members of the Armed Services and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police who are required to have access to classified information in the performance of their duties, must be persons in whose reliability and loyalty to his country the Government of Canada can repose full confidence. It has been clearly demonstrated that such confidence cannot be placed in persons whose loyalty to Canada and our system of government is diluted by loyalty to any Communist, Fascist, or other legal or illegal political organization whose purposes are inimical to the processes of parliamentary democracy. It is therefore an essential of Canadian security policy that persons described in paragraph 3 below must not, when known, be permitted to enter the public service, and must not if discovered within the public service be permitted to have access to classified information. If such a person is in a position where he has access to classified information, he must at least be transferred to a less sensitive position in the public service. It may also be necessary, where it appears to the Minister concerned to be in the public interest, to dismiss him from the public service, subject to the conditions set out at paragraph 17

2. Employees in the public service of Canada, including members of the Canadian Armed Forces and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, must be persons in whose reliability and loyalty to Canada the Government of Canada can repose full confidence<sup>1</sup>. It has been clearly demonstrated that such confidence cannot be placed in persons whose loyalty to Canada and its democratic system of government is diluted by loyalty to legal or illegal political and/or revolutionary organizations whose purposes are to alter or destroy by violent or non-violent means the Canadian nation and its form of democracy. It is, therefore, essential to the security of Canada that persons described in paragraph 3 below must not, when known, be permitted to enter the public service and if discovered within the public service must be dismissed forthwith in the public interest subject to the conditions set out in paragraph 17 below<sup>2</sup>.

*any other persons employed by the Fed. Govt*

~~political and/or revolutionary~~

or non-violent

*Illegal*

*in view of state reversal of current policy*

3. The persons referred to in paragraph 2 above are:
- (a) a person who is a member of a communist or fascist party or an organization affiliated with a communist or fascist party and having a similar nature and purpose;
  - (b) a person who by his words or his actions shows himself to support a communist or fascist party or an organization affiliated with a communist or fascist party and having a similar nature and purpose;
  - (c) a person who, having reasonable grounds to understand its true nature and purpose is a member of or supports by his words or his actions an organization which has as its real objective the furtherance of communist or fascist aims and policies (commonly known as a front group);
  - (d) a person who is a secret agent of or an informer for a foreign power, or who deliberately assists any such agent or informer;
  - (e) a person who by his words or his actions shows himself to support any organization

*Support persons (political) condensed to items*

3. The persons referred to in paragraph 2 above are:
- (a) a person who is a member of or supports by his words or his actions an organization which publicly or privately advocates or practices violence to alter the Canadian government and democratic process.
  - (b) a person who is a member of, or supports by his words or his actions, a party or organization which publicly or privately advocates or practises violence or non-violence for the dissolution of the Canadian nation.
  - (c) a person who \_\_\_\_\_ by his words or his actions, \_\_\_\_\_ publicly or privately seeks to erode the legitimacy of the democratically elected government and its institutions for the purpose of achieving their eventual overthrow without resort to the electoral process<sup>3</sup>.

*Political - 7*

*show words that be to the  
The legitimacy of the democratically elected government and its institutions for the purpose of achieving their eventual overthrow without resort to the electoral process<sup>3</sup>.*

*with a*

which publicly or privately advocates or practices the use of force to alter the form of government.

(d) a person who is a member of or supports by his words or his actions a communist or fascist party or an organization affiliated with a communist or fascist party and having a similar nature and purpose.

(e) a person who is a member of or supports by his words or his actions an <sup>organization</sup> ~~organization~~ which has as its real objective the furtherance of the aims and objectives of ~~organizations~~ mentioned in (a), (b), (c), and (d) above (i.e. front groups)

(f) a person who is a secret agent of, or an informer for a foreign power, or party or organization defined in (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) above, or who deliberately assists any such agent or informer.

*Comm. H. R. 111-101  
to  
H.C.S.*

*as for (d)  
committed to  
particular  
promoting?*

*suggest  
writing  
of original  
draft*

4. It must be borne in mind that there may be reason to doubt the loyalty of a person who at some previous time was a person as described in paragraph 3 above, even though this doubt may not be confirmed by recent information about him.

5. In addition to loyalty, reliability is essential in any person who is to be given access to classified information. A person may be unreliable for a number of reasons that do not relate to loyalty. To provide as much assurance of reliability as possible persons described in paragraph 6 below may not be permitted to have access to classified information, unless after careful consideration of the circumstances, including the value of their services, it is judged that the risk involved appears to be justified.

*Current review procedure should be this*

4. It must be borne in mind that there may be reason to doubt the loyalty of a person who at some previous time was a person as described in paragraph 3 above, even though this doubt may not be confirmed by recent information about him.

5. In addition to loyalty, reliability is desirable in any person who is to be employed by the public service. It is essential in any person who is to be given access to classified information. A person may be unreliable for a number of reasons that do not relate to loyalty. To provide as much assurance of reliability as possible persons described in paragraph 6 below may not be permitted to have access to classified information, unless after careful consideration of the circumstances by the responsible Deputy Minister, in consultation with the Departmental Security Officer, it is judged that the risk involved appears to be justified.

6. The persons referred to in paragraph 5 above are:

(a) a person who is unreliable, not because he is disloyal, but because of features of his character which may lead to indiscretion or dishonesty, or make him vulnerable to black-mail or coercion. Such features may be greed, debt, illicit sexual behaviour, drunkenness, drug addiction, mental imbalance, or such other aspect of character as might seriously affect his reliability;

(b) a person who, through family or other close continuing relationship with persons who are persons as described in paragraphs 3(a) to (e) above, is likely to be induced, either knowingly or unknowingly to act in a manner prejudicial to the safety and interest of Canada. It is not the kind of relationship, whether by blood, marriage or friendship, which is of primary concern. It is the degree of and circumstances surrounding such relationship, and most particularly the degree of

6. The persons referred to in paragraph 5 above are:

(a) a person who is unreliable, not because he is disloyal, but because of features of his character <sup>or conduct</sup> which may lead to indiscretion or dishonesty, or make him vulnerable to black-mail or coercion. Such features <sup>would</sup> ~~may~~ be greed, <sup>or debt</sup> debt, illicit sexual behaviour, drunkenness, drug addiction, mental imbalance, or such other aspect of character <sup>or conduct</sup> as might seriously affect his reliability;

(b) a person who, through family or other close continuing relationship with persons who are persons as described in paragraphs 3(a) to (f) above, is likely to be induced, either knowingly or unknowingly, to act in a manner prejudicial to the safety and interest of Canada. It is not the kind of relationship, whether by blood, marriage or friendship, which is of primary concern. It is the degree of and circumstances surrounding such relationship, and most particularly the degree of influence that might be exerted which should dictate a judgement

influence that might be exerted, which should dictate a judgement as to reliability, a judgement which must be taken with the utmost care; and

- (c) a person who, though in no sense disloyal or unreliable, is bound by close ties of blood or affection to persons living within the borders of such foreign nations as may cause him to be subjected to intolerable pressures.

as to reliability, a judgement which must be taken with the utmost care; and

- (c) a person who, though in no sense disloyal or unreliable, is bound by close ties of blood or affection to persons living within the borders of such foreign nations as may cause him <sup>her</sup> to be subjected to intolerable pressures.

7. In addition it must be recognized that there may be a serious risk to security in employing or permitting to be employed persons such as those described in paragraphs 3 or 6 above:

- (a) in certain positions in industrial firms and related establishments involved in or engaged upon the production or study of classified defence equipment which requires security protection; or
- (b) in positions in government organizations engaged in work of a nature vital to the national security which, although they do not normally involve access to classified information, may afford their incumbents opportunities to gain unauthorized access to such information.

7. In addition it must be recognized that there may be a serious risk to security in employing or permitting to be employed persons such as those described in paragraphs 3 or 6 above:

- (a) in certain positions in industrial firms and related establishments involved in or engaged upon the production or study of <sup>material which</sup> ~~classified~~ <sup>requires security protection</sup> ~~defence equipment which requires security protection~~ or
- (b) in positions in government organizations engaged in work of a nature vital to the national security which, although they do not normally involve access to classified information, may afford their incumbents opportunities to gain unauthorized access to such information.

8. To carry out their responsibility for the safekeeping of the secrets of the Government of Canada and her allies, departments and agencies must first obtain sufficient information about a person to be given access to these secrets in order that a reasonable judgement might be made as to his or her loyalty and reliability. In making this administrative judgement, it must always be borne in mind that, while the interests of the national security must take precedence where there is a reasonable doubt, the safeguarding of the interests of the individual is also essential to the preservation of the society we seek to protect. Information bearing on the security status of an employee will be treated as confidential.

PROCEDURE

9. The following procedures by which this policy is to be implemented are designed to provide that the most careful screening possible be given, particularly to persons who will have access to highly classified information. It is the continuing responsibility of each government department and agency to ensure that its security remains unimpaired.

*Handwritten notes:*  
 8. ~~responsibility~~  
 8. ~~responsibility~~

8. To carry out their responsibility for the safekeeping of ~~the~~ <sup>information requiring security protection</sup> secrets of the Government of Canada and her allies, departments and agencies must first obtain sufficient information about a person to be given access to these secrets in order that a reasonable judgement might be made as to his or her loyalty and reliability. In making this administrative judgement, it must always be borne in mind that, while the interests of the national security must take precedence where there is a reasonable doubt, the safeguarding of the interests of the individual is also essential to the preservation of the society we seek to protect. Information bearing on the security status of an employee will be treated as confidential.

PROCEDURE

9. The following procedures by which this policy is to be implemented are designed to provide that the most careful screening possible be given, particularly to persons who will have access to highly classified information. It is the continuing responsibility of each government department and agency to ensure that its security remains unimpaired. Notwithstanding this responsibility, departments and agencies will be guided in their decisions and implementation of security policies by

5000  
Sub: Daniel  
was in a  
that  
previously

the Security Advisory Committee,  
and will seek advice from the  
Security Advisory Committee for  
the resolution of conflicts  
between security and departmental  
or other interests.

10. Information about persons who are being considered for access to classified information must be obtained at least from the persons themselves, from referees named by the persons, and from investigations conducted by authorized investigative agencies. Departments and agencies will inform persons who are being considered for access to classified information of the reasons for seeking background information about them, and to explain to them the dangers to themselves as well as to the national security in their attempting to conceal any information which may have a bearing on the degree of confidence that can be reposed in them.

11. The functions of an investigative agency are to conduct promptly and efficiently such investigations as are requested by departments or agencies to assist them in determining the loyalty and reliability of the subject of investigation; and to inform departments and agencies of the results of their investigations in the form of factual reports in which the sources have been carefully evaluated as to the reliability of the information they have provided.

10. Information about persons who are being considered for access to classified information must be obtained at least from the persons themselves, from referees named by the persons, and from investigations conducted by authorized investigative agencies. Departments and agencies will inform persons who are being considered for access to classified information of the reasons for seeking background information about them, and to explain to them the dangers to themselves as well as to the national security in their attempting to conceal any information which may have a bearing on the degree of confidence that can be reposed in them.

11. The functions of an investigative agency are to conduct promptly and efficiently such investigations as are requested by departments or agencies to assist them in determining the loyalty and reliability of the subject of investigation, and to inform departments and agencies of the results of their investigations in the form of factual reports in which the sources have been carefully evaluated as to the reliability of the information they have provided.

*Shades of  
Solis State*

12. On the basis of these reports and such other pertinent information as has been obtained from the person concerned, from the character references which he has given, and from such other sources of information as may have been utilized, the employing department or agency will arrive at a considered judgement of the person's loyalty and reliability, and of the degree of confidence that can be reposed in him to carry out safely and efficiently the duties to be performed.

13. If a favourable determination is made, the department or agency may grant a security clearance to the level required for the efficient performance of the duties of the position concerned. If, on the other hand, there is in the judgement of the deputy minister of the department or the head of agency concerned a reasonable doubt as to the degree of confidence which can be reposed in the subject, the granting of a security clearance will be delayed until the doubt has been resolved to the satisfaction of the deputy minister or the head of agency.

12. On the basis of these reports and such other pertinent information as has been obtained from the person concerned, from the character references which he has given, and from such other sources of information as may have been utilized, the employing department or agency will arrive at a considered judgement of the person's loyalty and reliability, and of the degree of confidence that can be reposed in him, ~~to carry out safely and efficiently the duties to be performed.~~

*How can this be done?*  
*This is a question of degree.*  
13. If a favourable determination is made, the department or agency may grant a security clearance to the level required for the efficient performance of the duties of the position concerned. If, on the other hand, there is, in the judgement of the deputy minister of the department or, the head of agency, concerned, a reasonable doubt as to the degree of confidence which can be reposed in the subject, the granting of a security clearance will be delayed until the doubt has been resolved to the satisfaction of the deputy minister or the head of agency, as specified in paragraphs 14 and 15 below.

14. Where an applicant for employment in the public service, as opposed to a person already employed, is being considered for appointment to a position requiring access to classified information and doubt has arisen as to his suitability for such access, the following courses of action may be taken with a view to resolving that doubt:

- (a) further specific investigation may be requested of an authorized investigative agency; or
- (b) the department or agency may at any time seek the advice of the interdepartmental Security Panel.

14. Where an applicant for employment in the public service, as opposed to a person already employed, is being considered for appointment to a position requiring access to classified information, and doubt has arisen as to his suitability for such access, the applicant will  
<sup>be interviewed by a trained</sup>  
~~will be interviewed by a trained~~

Security Officer appointed by the Security Advisory Committee.  
If the doubt is not resolved, the Security Officer, department or agency may request further specific investigation or, through the Security Advisory Committee, may seek the advice of the Interdepartmental Committee on Security and Intelligence.

15. Where a person is already employed in the public service, and a doubt has been raised as to his suitability to have access to classified information, the security officer of the department or agency must take such action as is necessary to preserve security and may take the courses of action referred to in paragraph 14 with a view to resolving that doubt. Should these actions fail to resolve the doubt, or appear to the department or agency to be inexpedient under the circumstances, the assistance of the employee himself shall be sought in an attempt to resolve the doubt. A senior officer appointed by the deputy minister or head of agency shall, after appropriate consultation with the investigative agency or other source of the information which raised the doubt, interview the subject and inform him, to the fullest extent that is possible without jeopardizing important and sensitive sources of security information, of the reasons for doubt, and shall give the employee an opportunity to resolve it to the satisfaction of the responsible department or agency.

15. Where a person is already employed in the public service, and a doubt has been raised as to his suitability to have access to classified information, the security officer of the department or agency will specify actions necessary to preserve security, and will request specific investigation to resolve the doubt. Should this investigation fail to resolve the doubt, the assistance of the employee himself will be sought in an attempt to resolve the doubt. The Security Advisory Committee will be requested to appoint a <sup>competent</sup> ~~trained~~ Security Officer who will, after appropriate consultation with the investigative agency or other source of the information which raised the doubt, interview the subject and inform him, to the fullest extent that is possible without jeopardizing important and sensitive sources of security information, of the reasons for doubt, and will give the employee an opportunity to resolve it to the satisfaction of the responsible department or agency.

*ES*  
*Not proper SAC role*

16. Should none of the courses set out in paragraph 15 above result in a satisfactory resolution of doubt concerning a government employee, the responsible department or agency shall withhold a security clearance, shall take such action as is necessary to preserve security and shall consult the Secretariat of the Security Panel with a view to their assisting the department or agency in determining tentatively:

- (a) whether the subject might safely and usefully be appointed to a less sensitive position in the department or agency or elsewhere in the public service, with his knowledge and consent to the fullest degree possible under the circumstances;
- (b) if appointment elsewhere is not possible, whether he should be asked to resign his position in the department or agency; or
- (c) if he refuses to resign, whether it should be recommended to the Minister responsible that the person be dismissed from the public service.

16. Should none of the courses set out in paragraph 15 above result in a satisfactory resolution of doubt concerning a government employee, the responsible department or agency will withhold a security clearance, take such actions as are necessary to preserve security, and consult the Security Advisory Committee with a view to their assisting the department or agency in determining:

- (a) whether the employee should be asked to resign his position in the department or agency; or
- (b) if he refuses to resign, whether it should be recommended to the Minister responsible that the person be dismissed from the public service.

17. Should the department decide that a recommendation for dismissal should be made, no action shall be taken on such recommendation until:

- (a) the deputy minister or head of agency has personally made a complete review of the case, and has himself interviewed the employee in question, in a further attempt to resolve any reasonable doubt as to his trustworthiness;
- (b) the employee has been advised, to the fullest extent possible without jeopardizing important and sensitive sources of security information, why doubt continues to be felt concerning his loyalty or reliability, and has been given a further opportunity to submit any information or considerations that he thinks ought to be taken into account on his behalf by the deputy minister or head of agency; and failing a satisfactory resolution,
- (c) the advice of a board of review drawn from the members of the Security Panel has been sought on the basis of all the information available. (The board of review shall consist of the Chairman and at least two

17. Should the department decide that a recommendation for dismissal should be made, the following steps will be taken before such recommendation is acted upon:

- (a) the deputy minister or head of agency will personally make a complete review of the case, and will himself interview the employee in question, in a further attempt to resolve any reasonable doubt as to his trustworthiness;
- (b) the employee will be advised to the fullest extent possible without jeopardizing important and sensitive sources of security information, why doubt continues to be felt concerning his loyalty or reliability, and will be given a further opportunity to submit any information or considerations that he thinks ought to be taken into account on his behalf by the deputy minister or head of agency;
- (c) failing a satisfactory resolution after (a) and (b) above the advice of a board of review drawn from the members of the Interdepartmental Committee on Security and Intelligence will be sought on the basis of all

members of the Security Panel, with the proviso that no member who is directly concerned with the case shall sit as a member of the board.)

of review will consist of the Chairman and at least two members of the Committee, with the proviso that no member who is directly concerned with the case will sit as a member of the board.)

18. In arriving at a final decision as to whether to recommend to the Governor in Council that an employee be dismissed on grounds of security, the Minister responsible will take into account all of the relevant information and advice that has been provided, but the Minister is not bound to act on such advice.

19. The numbers of all persons who for security reasons are removed from eligible lists by the Civil Service Commission, or are in one way or another refused access to classified information by departments or agencies for security reasons, will be sent quarterly to the Secretary of the Security Panel in order that the Panel may from time to time review the number of persons or the type of cases involved, and assess the extent of the security problem in the public service./ The figures provided should be broken down in the following general categories; persons dismissed, persons permitted to resign, persons transferred to non-sensitive posts, persons denied access to classified information, persons denied employment. In addition the figures should indicate whether the action was taken on grounds of disloyalty or unreliability. Figures should not include persons who are no longer

18. In arriving at a final decision as to whether to recommend to the Governor in Council that an employee be dismissed on grounds of security, the Minister responsible will take into account all of the relevant information and advice that has been provided, and the recommendation of the Board of Review from the Interdepartmental Committee <sup>of</sup> Security and Intelligence.

19. The numbers of all persons who for security reasons are removed from eligible lists by the Public Service Commission, or are in one way or another refused <sup>or deprived of</sup> access to classified information by departments or agencies for security reasons, will be sent quarterly to the Secretary of the Interdepartmental Committee on Security and Intelligence in order that the Committee may from time to time review the number of persons or the type of cases involved, and assess the extent <sup>of</sup> the security problem in the public service.

given access to classified information  
because of a change in duties or  
other similar administrative reasons.

omit

20. It is the responsibility of each deputy head, or head of an agency, to nominate a competent senior official, preferably the Senior Personnel Officer, to act as security officer, and to notify the Secretary of the Security Panel of the appointment and of any subsequent change. The official so nominated shall be cleared for security in accordance with the procedures set out in paragraph 25(i) below. The person so named will be responsible to the deputy head or head of an agency for ensuring that all regulations relative to security are carried out within the department or agency. It will also be the responsibility of the departmental security officer to maintain close liaison with the government agencies responsible for security policy and procedures. It is important that wherever possible security officers should be persons who may be expected to continue their work over a long period of time, since effective security is difficult to maintain without considerable experience in a specialized field.

20. It is the responsibility of each Deputy Minister, or head of an agency, to employ a <sup>competently</sup> trained /security officer and to notify the Secretary of the Interdepartmental Committee on Security and Intelligence of the appointment. Since security is a specialized field requiring considerable training and experience, it is of paramount importance that each security officer be carefully selected and accorded the full support of the Deputy Minister or head of agency in the implementation of governmental and departmental security policies. The security officer will be cleared for security in accordance with the procedures set out in paragraph 25(i) below. He will be responsible to the Deputy Minister or head of an agency for ensuring that all regulations relative to security are carried out within the department or agency. It will also be the responsibility of the departmental security officer to maintain close liaison with the government departments and agencies responsible for security policy and procedures.

METHODS

21. Security screening of applicants to the public service will be initiated by the Civil Service Commission, or by departments and agencies in the case of persons not employed under the Civil Service Act. Where persons already employed in a department or agency are to be given access to classified information, security screening will be initiated by the department or agency concerned.

22. When it appears necessary on security grounds for the Civil Service Commission to reject an applicant, or a candidate for a position involving access to classified information who is already in the public employ, the Commission will when appropriate consult with the interested department in order to reach a joint agreement as to what action may finally be taken, bearing in mind the fact that the ultimate responsibility for security rests with the department.

METHODS

21. Security screening of applicants to the public service will be initiated by the Public Service Commission, or by the employing departments and agencies in the case of persons not employed under the Public Service Employment Act. Where persons already employed in a department or agency are to be given access to classified information, security screening will be initiated by the department or agency concerned through the Departmental Security Officer.

22. (a) The Public Service Commission <sup>departments & agencies</sup> will reject an applicant for a position in the public service involving access to classified information when such applicant cannot qualify for a security clearance.

*or by employing agencies*  
*to reject*

(b) When it appears necessary on security grounds for the Public Service Commission <sup>departments & agencies</sup> to reject a candidate, who is already in the public employ, for a position involving access to classified information, the Commission will, when appropriate, consult with the interested department in order to reach a joint agreement as to what

*or by employing agencies*

bearing in mind the fact that  
the ultimate responsibility  
for security rests with the  
department.

23. When it appoints to a department a new employee who has been the subject of a security screening, the Civil Service Commission will send forward to the department all the pertinent information and documentation relating to the security screening.

24. A person to be appointed to a permanent position in the public service will not normally be made the subject of security screening for this reason alone. But whenever a person to be appointed to such a position is, in the opinion of the deputy minister or head of agency concerned, likely to be required eventually to have access to classified information, that person shall before being given a permanent appointment, be made the subject of a fingerprint and file check if this has not already been done.

23. When it appoints to a department a new employee who has been the subject of a security screening, the Public Service Commission will send forward to the department all the pertinent information and documentation relating to the security screening.

24. A person appointed to a permanent position in the public service ~~will not~~ <sup>should</sup> normally be made the subject of security screening for this reason alone. If a person has been selected for a permanent appointment in the public service and, if, in the opinion of the deputy minister or head of agency concerned, he may have immediate or eventual access to classified information, either by design or accident, then it is essential that the person be made the subject of security screening before a permanent position in the public service is offered to him.

*improvement  
acknowledging*

*24. 1974 - removed in 1974 - note  
account increasing in  
date 2.1.74  
after probation?*

25. Within the policies and procedures set out above, a security assessment and clearance will be made by the following means. These represent security criteria and methods which are consistent with present investigative services available interdepartmentally; they are minimum standards and do not limit in any way the right of the armed forces to conduct field checks, through their own resources, of personnel employed with or on behalf of the Department of National Defence.

(i) Persons to have access to Top Secret information

Before a person is employed in a position requiring access to Top Secret information he must be the subject of an investigation in the field by an appropriate investigative agency, his name must be checked against the subversive records of the R.C.M. Police, and he must be the subject of a fingerprint check by the R.C.M. Police. These procedures are mandatory.

(ii) Persons to have access to Secret Information

(a) Before a person is employed in a position requiring access to Secret information his name must be checked against the subversive

*Change made dependent on R.C.M. Police*

25. Within the policies and procedures set out above, a security assessment and clearance will be made by the following means. These represent security criteria and methods which are consistent with present investigative services available interdepartmentally; they are minimum standards and do not limit in any way the right of the armed forces to conduct field checks, through their own resources, of personnel employed with or on behalf of the Department of National Defence.

(i) Persons to have access to Top Secret information

Before a person is employed in a position requiring access to Top Secret information he must be the subject of an investigation in the field by an appropriate *(going back 10 or 20 years depending on investigative agency)* his name *(clearance required)* must be checked against the subversive records of the R.C.M. Police, and he must be the subject of a fingerprint check by the R.C.M. Police. These procedures are mandatory.

*combine ii & iii as procedure the same*  
(ii) Persons to have access to Secret Information

*and for Confidential*  
(a) Before a person is employed in a position requiring access to Secret information his name must be checked against the sub-

Police, and he must be the subject of a fingerprint check by the R.C.M. Police. Both these procedures are mandatory.

- (b) When the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission or the deputy head of a department or agency, or a security officer appointed by them, considers that information provided by the means set out in paragraph 25(ii) (a) may be clarified by an investigation in the field, or that such an investigation is necessary to satisfy him as to an applicant's or employee's loyalty and reliability, he may request that an inquiry be made of a person's background by a field investigation to be carried out by an appropriate investigative agency. Where it appears that requests from a department or agency dealing with the R.C.M. Police as the investigative agency exceed what seems to be a normal requirement, the R.C.M. Police may ask the Security Panel to allot priorities

and he must be the subject of a fingerprint check by the R.C.M. Police. Both these procedures are mandatory.

- (b) When the Chairman of the Public Service Commission or the deputy head of a department or agency, or a security officer appointed by them, considers that information provided by the means set out in paragraph 25(ii) (a) may be clarified by an investigation in the field, or that such an investigation is necessary to satisfy him as to an applicant's or employee's loyalty and reliability, he may request that an inquiry be made of a person's background by a field investigation to be carried out by an appropriate investigative agency. Where it appears that requests from a department or agency dealing with the R.C.M. Police as the investigative agency exceed what seems to be a normal requirement, the R.C.M. Police may ask the Interdepartmental Committee on Security and Intelligence

(iii) Persons to have access to Confidential information

Before a person is employed in a position requiring access to Confidential information, his name must be checked against the subversive records of the R.C.M. Police, and he must be the subject of a fingerprint check by the R.C.M. Police. Both of these procedures are mandatory.

(iv) Responsibility for granting clearances

The deputy head of a department or agency will be responsible for granting or withholding a security clearance and will assume a continuing responsibility for a person's access to Top Secret, Secret and Confidential information.

(iii) Persons-to have access to Confidential information

Before a person is employed in a position requiring access to Confidential information, his name must be checked against the subversive records of the R.C.M. Police, and he must be the subject of a fingerprint check by the R.C.M. Police. Both of these procedures are mandatory.

<sup>iii</sup>  
(i) Responsibility for granting clearances

The deputy head of a department or agency will be responsible for granting or withholding a security clearance and will assume a continuing responsibility for a person's access to ~~Secret, Secret and Confidential~~ <sup>material requiring security protection</sup> information.

*add. screening procedure for gov't employees generally. (Confidential screening with P(HF))*

26. In addition, departments and agencies are reminded that personal consultation with the references listed by the employee in his Personal History Form may provide useful supplementary information about his character. References should therefore be consulted personally when it appears that a useful purpose would be served by so doing.

27. Comparable procedures set forth in paragraph 25, except those relating to fingerprinting, apply equally to persons employed in defence industry (and certain services related to defence) who may be required to have access to classified information which is the property of the Government of Canada or for the security of which the government is responsible. In defence industry (and certain services related to defence) the procedures will be administered by the Department of Defence Production in accordance with a separate directive relating to security in defence industry.

26. In addition, departments and agencies are reminded that personal consultation with the references listed by the employee in his Personal History Form may provide useful supplementary information about his character. References should therefore be consulted personally when it appears that a useful purpose would be served by so doing.<sup>4</sup>

27. Comparable procedures set forth in paragraph 25, apply equally to persons employed in defence industry (and certain services related to defence) who may be required to have access to classified information which is the property of the Government of Canada or for the security of which the government is responsible. In defence industry (and certain services related to defence) the procedures will be administered by the <sup>Security</sup> Department of Supply and Services in accordance with a separate directive relating to security in defence industry.

NOTES

Note 1 The impression is given in Cabinet Directive No. 35 that only those who have access to classified material should be of sufficient character as to allow the Canadian Government to have confidence in them. It is submitted that the requirement is for the very best kind of personnel for the public service.

*Agreed: but majority are in a very high role.*

Note 2 Cabinet Directive No. 35 permits persons described in paragraph 3 to remain in the public service in a less sensitive position. It is submitted that this is not in the national interest.

*We would rather not have them?*

Note 3 Cabinet Directive No. 35 does not take into account those groups which publicly or privately advocate or practice the use of non-violence or non-force to alter the form of government. Extra Parliamentary Opposition and members of the New Left have infiltrated the Federal Government with the purpose of overthrowing parliamentary democracy by non-violent means.

*of 100 - 200  
 who are not  
 responsible  
 and want to  
 by a political  
 a political  
 (the 100-200)  
 every one*

Note 4

- (a) A thorough follow up of reference information supplied by applicants for positions in the public service should be carried out by Public Service Commission staffing authorities. Where any doubt arises RCMP Police records and fingerprint files should be consulted.
- (b) Dispensation of security clearance, or of even cursory credential examination of those hired on short term contracts with the Federal Government, is an open invitation for the abuse of the intent of this directive . It is recommended, as a minimum safeguard that all persons on short term contract be required, where any doubt as to character exists, to be the subject of an investigation by the Security Service.