

13-6-63

DRAFT #2.

SECRET

SECRET

G3559-1 ~~SECRET~~ SECURITY SCREENING

DEFINITIONS:

Directorate - The Directorate of Security and Intelligence of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

Branch - "A" Branch of the Directorate. Responsible for the processing of all requests for security screening directed to the R.C.M.P. by or on behalf of domestic or foreign government departments or agencies.

Section - A unit of manpower within "A" Branch, processing requests from a specified group of government departments and agencies, or, performing a support task. There are eleven sections in "A" Branch. *(see Appendix)*

ORIGINS OF SECURITY SCREENING

Although security screening as it is carried out in Canada today is generally considered to have come about as a result of the 1946 Royal Commission on Espionage, a less sophisticated form of security screening was being performed before that date. As early as 1933 the RCMP had an agreement with the Civil Service Commission to conduct character enquiries on applicants for, or employees of, the Federal Civil Service when the Commission considered such action necessary. In addition, during World War II the RCMP, upon request, carried out records checks and character enquiries on personnel of the Armed Forces, the National Research Council and three foreign government agencies, and records checks only for another ten Canadian and foreign government agencies.

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Therefore, when action was started, in mid-1946, to implement the Royal Commission's recommendations on security screening the RCMP had some experience in the type of work involved. On the basis both of this rather limited practical experience and of an examination of the security screening procedures then in effect in the United Kingdom and the United States, a co-ordinated Canadian security screening programme was conceived.

OBJECTIVES OF SECURITY SCREENING

(1) Screening for Sensitive Federal Government Employment

The initial steps taken to develop a co-ordinated Canadian security screening programme were designed to meet two of the recommendations made by the Royal Commission:

- (a) "That all security measures should be co-ordinated and rendered as uniform as possible."
- (b) "That consideration be given to any additional security measures which would be practical to prevent the infiltration into positions of trust under the Government of persons likely to commit acts such as those described in this Report."

To implement the first recommendation, an Interdepartmental Security Panel was established by Cabinet decision in mid-1946.

In its decision the Cabinet specified that the Panel was to be comprised of the Secretary of the Cabinet acting as Chairman, a Vice-Chairman, the Directors of Intelligence of the three Armed Services,

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the Director General of Defence Research or his representative, and representatives of the Department of External Affairs and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Provision was made for any government department, not permanently represented on the Panel, to bring matters to the attention of the Panel and to have a representative present during any Panel discussion of a matter in which the department was directly concerned.

The terms of reference for the Panel were:

- (1) To advise the Cabinet on the co-ordination of planning, organization and execution of security measures which affect government departments; and
- (2) to advise on such other security questions as may be referred to it.

On these terms the Panel undertook the responsibility for recommending, for Cabinet approval, broad terms of reference under which security policies and procedures would be carried out and the responsibility to act in an advisory capacity to the various government departments and agencies on matters relating to physical and personnel security. The Panel was given no executive power but exercises indirect control of the security screening programme through its membership.

On April 9, 1953 the Cabinet approved a reconstitution of the Security Panel and the establishment of a Security Sub-Panel. The Sub-Panel was given full authority to deal with all interdepartmental security problems other than

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those involving major policy decisions and particularly difficult security cases. The Security Panel was left free to deal only with the more serious problems of policy, and for this purpose was reconstituted on a Deputy Minister level.

In 1953 the members of the Security Panel were: Secretary to the Cabinet - Chairman; Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs; Deputy Minister of National Defence; Deputy Minister of Defence Production; Deputy Minister of Citizenship and Immigration; Commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted Police; Member of Privy Council Office - Secretary. To this body were added, in 1957, the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission and the Deputy Minister of Justice.

Membership of the Sub-Panel consists of a senior official from each department represented on the Security Panel. While the Sub-Panel enjoys some degree of autonomy the Chairman of the Sub-Panel must consult with the Chairman of the Panel for guidance where the line of demarcation between matters to be handled by the Sub-Panel and those by the Panel are not clearly defined or where the Sub-Panel Chairman feels recommendations of the Sub-Panel may require confirmation.

One of the first tasks of the Security Panel was to obtain Cabinet approval of a broad policy to cover security screening generally, within which the government departments and agencies might formulate their own policies and procedures to meet their particular requirements. In January

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1947 the Panel was authorized "to devise appropriate procedures designed to achieve some measure of uniformity with regard to these matters". These procedures, as outlined in various Cabinet Directives, are dealt with in detail later.

A second immediate task of the Panel was to secure the appointment of security officers in certain government departments and agencies which were considered to have high potential as targets for penetration by the Soviet Bloc Intelligence Services. These security officers were to be responsible to their respective Ministers for the implementation of the security screening measures adopted by the department.

The third initial task of the Panel was the composition and publication of a booklet on security, treating on such matters as the classification and safeguarding of information, and physical and personnel security.

Each of these steps was designed, directly or indirectly, to educate government departments and agencies in the need for security measures, and to establish a unified security screening programme under the direction of one co-ordinating body.

The establishment of a Security Panel and the initial steps taken by it were the first measures adopted to implement the Royal Commission recommendations referred to earlier. From this ground-work a new Canadian security screening programme was launched toward its main objective: preventing the employment, on duties giving access

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to classified defence information, of persons considered to be potential targets for recruitment by a foreign power.

Although the Royal Commission's recommendations on security screening were related only to the protection of classified government information, the process has had much wider application. In fact, approximately 70% of all requests for security screening relate to prospective immigrants, persons applying for Canadian citizenship, and applicants for U.S. visas.

(2) Screening of Immigrants
(Visa Control)

In October 1946 the RCMP was called upon to take over the Visa Control responsibilities of the Immigration Branch of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration relating to the security screening of prospective immigrants to Canada and their sponsors.

Terms of reference for the security screening of immigrants are set out in detail in Section 5 of the Immigration Act, and in the Visa Control Manual of Instructions. The policies adopted and modified to carry out security screening procedures as an integrated segment of the Immigration Act, and Regulations, have been formulated with the advice of the Security Panel and through direct liaison between the RCMP and the Department of Citizenship and Immigration.

The effectiveness of security screening of immigrants is restricted in the main by the number of persons who are admitted to Canada under

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a Departmental waiver of security screening, and by the absence of available facilities or the limited co-operation of the national security agency in the country in which the prospective immigrant resides.

In November 1960 the Interdepartmental Review Committee on Immigration Security Rejections was established. Its members are a senior official from each of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, the Department of External Affairs, the Privy Council Office, and the R.C.M.P. This Committee examines those cases in which representations for the admission of a prospective immigrant are made to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration following the rejection of the prospective immigrant on security grounds. The Committee reviews all available information and recommends either a clearance, a deferment, or a continued rejection for the decision of the Deputy Minister.

(3) Screening of Applicants
for Citizenship

In February 1954 the Directorate assumed responsibility for the processing of requests for screening of all applicants for Canadian citizenship. Prior to that time these requests were handled by the Directorate of Operations and Criminal Investigations, and only cases which revealed a positive or doubtful trace, when checked against subversive records, were referred to "A" Branch for action.

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
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There are restrictions on the extent of coverage provided in screening citizenship applicants. Applicants are subjected to a check of subversive records only, unless the records check produces a positive or doubtful trace whereupon the case ^{limited enquiries to establish the political sympathies of the applicant.} is referred to the field for ~~investigation~~. Secondly, in many cases the check of records is limited to the five-year period preceding the date of application; this occurs when the applicant was an immigrant to Canada five years earlier and has just established the period of residence required by law. Thirdly, in contrast to the policy for screening applicants for government employment, an application for citizenship will be rejected or deferred on security grounds only if adverse information is developed on the applicant himself; no cognizance is given to the Communist or Fascist sympathies or activities of the applicant's immediate family.

In October 1950 the Interdepartmental Committee on Citizenship was established, composed of a senior official from the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, the Department of External Affairs, and the R.C.M.P. This Committee examines all available information in those cases where an adverse report has been submitted by the Branch on an applicant, ^{it} ~~and~~ then submits a recommendation for acceptance, deferment or rejection of the application for the decision of the Deputy Minister of Citizenship and Immigration.

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TERMS OF REFERENCE

SECURITY SCREENING FOR EMPLOYMENT IN OR
BY FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND
AGENCIES

(1) CABINET DIRECTIVES:

The principles of security screening, or "vetting" as it was originally called, were set out in a December 12, 1946 memorandum to the Cabinet Defence Committee by the Security Panel. The process

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of vetting was described as "the process of enquiring into the antecedents of applicants for government employment to determine their suitability from a security point of view". Consideration was given to the advisability of drawing up a list of criteria by which "suitability from a security point of view" might be determined, but the opinion was held that any decision affecting an applicant or employee must permit the exercise of judgement based on the circumstances of each individual case. The best criterion devised and generally accepted is that when "after a careful examination of all the available information pertinent to both loyalty and character provided by an approved investigating agency in the form of an evaluated, factual report, a continuing doubt of loyalty or reliability remains in the mind of a reasonable man and when national security is involved, that doubt must be resolved in favour of the state".

As stated in the 1946 memorandum, the vetting to be carried out at the request of government departments was of two types:

- (i) a file check - containing information readily available covering such aspects as police records;
- (ii) a special enquiry - entailing a complete personal investigation through all available sources. The Panel recommended that a "special enquiry" be requested by departments only ^{of} ~~and~~ applicants who are

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being considered for employment on work classified as "Secret" or "Top Secret".

The responsibility for determining who was to be subjected to vetting and what action was to be taken on the results was made exclusively that of the employing department or agency. The RCMP was not called upon to comment or make recommendations on the security risk presented by any person vetted. In conclusion, the memorandum emphasized that the success of the security screening programme depended heavily on the maintenance of good liaison between employing departments and the R.C.M.P.

Following Cabinet approval of these principles on January 16, 1947, the Security Panel began to draw up terms of reference for the security screening programme. These were issued as Cabinet Directive #4 on March 5, 1948 (reference Appendix "A"). In recognition of the fact that the requirements of departments and agencies would vary considerably the Directive did not attempt to lay down any hard and fast rules for security screening; rather it set forth a broad statement of the policy and procedures within which the programme might function.

Although three subsequent directives (4A, 24 and 29 - reference Appendices "B", "C", and "D") have been issued, modifying the terms of reference on the basis of experience gained, the latest of these, Cabinet Directive #29, issued on December 29, 1955 and amended on December 14, 1960 presents no radical change from the initial precepts of security screening. It retains the original

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views that each department is responsible for the administration and execution of security screening procedures, and that the R.C.M.P. is exclusively a fact-finding agency whose responsibility in this field is only to provide employing departments and agencies with an evaluated, factual report of any check of records or field investigation it conducts at the request of the department or agency.

(2) APPLICATION OF SECURITY SCREENING
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

While there has been no material change in the basic concept of security screening or the terms of reference within which the programme is carried out, the policies and procedures adopted by the Directorate to meet its responsibilities in this field have been modified in many ways, primarily to improve efficiency and effectiveness, but on several occasions simply to relieve over-taxation of "A" Branch resources.

When the new security screening programme commenced late in 1946 the Branch stated a number of conditions under which its duties in the programme could best be performed. These were:

- (i) That each request for security screening be accompanied by a standard questionnaire, completed by the applicant.
- (ii) That each request indicate whether a records check or full field investigation is required.
- (iii) That the employing department submit fingerprints of each applicant.

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- (iv) That screening reports would be factual and would contain no recommendations on any information contained therein.
- (v) That screening reports be considered confidential, their contents not to be revealed to the person under investigation.
- (vi) That screening reports be seen only by department officials directly concerned with security arrangements.
- (vii) That a senior official of the department be designated with whom the RCMP would deal on matters of security screening.
- (viii) That the senior official so designated should feel free at any time to consult with appropriate officers of the RCMP on matters of procedure or individual security problems.

While there was no formal proposal or acceptance of these conditions they have been generally practiced since 1947. Variations in their interpretation and application have brought about a number of changes and restrictions in security screening procedures, as indicated hereunder:

- (i) From time to time amendments have been made to overcome deficiencies in the questionnaire; it is currently undergoing complete revision by the Security Panel. The reason for

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previous amendments and the current revision has been the need for a questionnaire which would provide sufficient background information on an applicant and his relatives to enable a more thorough security check to be carried out.

(ii) Up to 1953 a security screening records check was made up of the following components:

- (a) a search of subversive records
- (b) a search of C.I.B. (criminal) records
- (c) a search of fingerprint records, when prints were submitted.

Late in 1952 it became mandatory for departments to submit fingerprints of all applicants for processing against criminal fingerprint records. The procedure was adopted for two reasons. First, a fingerprint check is the only accurate way in which criminal records can be searched. Secondly, because of the back log of requests for security screening which had developed in the Branch by 1952, Cabinet Directive #24 was issued permitting departments to clear employees to "Confidential" after being satisfied as to their good character; the subversive indices check was temporarily suspended for that category. This left only the criminal records check available to the departments.

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Then in July 1953 the C.I.B. records check was eliminated from the security screening programme because it had been determined that the results obtained from checking these records was negligible in relation to the time and manpower expended. This partial programme^{of screening} continued until May 1955.

- (iii) The handling of R.C.M.P. security screening reports by departments has been a continuing source of contention between the R.C.M.P. and the departments. There have been a number of instances where reports or their contents have been disseminated by the departments, to persons other than those recognized by the R.C.M.P. as having authority to receive such information. In some of these cases the information has been passed to the person under investigation, causing considerable embarrassment to the R.C.M.P. Because the R.C.M.P. has no control over a report after it is received by the employing department, and because of the unsatisfactory conditions in this regard which existed at the time the programme was introduced the R.C.M.P. has restricted the passing of field investigation reports to seven departments and agencies. Originally even field investigation reports containing slightly derogatory information

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were passed to these selected few, but in consequence of the circumstances described above this practice was modified so that only reports which contained favourable information were provided. All other federal government departments and agencies receive only a letter stating that an enquiry has been carried out with no derogatory information revealed.

In 1961 the process of providing copies of field investigation reports was given careful consideration by the Directorate and it was decided that the Branch was not fulfilling its responsibility ^{of providing} to provide departments with a factual, evaluated report of its enquiries. Consequently, the seven departments and agencies which were receiving field reports now receive a summary prepared in the Branch of all favourable information obtained from enquiries.

The general policy for providing departments and agencies with adverse information on an applicant or a member of his immediate family has also undergone modification. In the initial stages of the security screening programme, when derogatory information was developed, particularly during the subversive records check, the department or agency was not provided with the information in writing.

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The Branch advised only that adverse information had come to light and would be passed verbally if the Deputy Minister or, in some cases, the Security Officer would contact an officer of the Directorate personally. Although this procedure required and fostered close liaison it proved to be too cumbersome and inefficient, and was gradually replaced by arrangements whereby all departments and agencies are provided with a "brief" of all adverse information. As a result of this modification, which was introduced in 1950 and became universal by 1955, close liaison between departments and the R.C.M.P. has diminished considerably.

Modifications have also been made to the procedures followed in conducting field investigations. The attitude of the R.C.M.P. toward security screening enquiries is indicated in the following extract from a policy instruction issued in 1947:

- (1) Investigations into the character and background of employees and applicants are carried out by this Force with emphasis being placed on security.
- (2) Investigations of this nature are to be pursued with the purpose in view of having the person concerned cleared for security as thoroughly as possible to the satisfaction of both the Force and the interested department or agency. The importance of this cannot be too forcibly emphasized.
- (3) Essential points to be covered are as follows: character and background including a check of the subject's relatives and associates; scholastic record; previous employment and residence; record in the armed services, if any; clubs or societies with which affiliated; local environment.
- (4) As indicated elsewhere in the Instruction Book, information as to a person's character background is as essential in Civil Service Commission cases as is

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security background. In the above cases emphasis is placed on the security aspect however any information of a derogatory nature as to morals, character, etc, if known or learned casually during an enquiry, should be reported upon but should not be specifically investigated unless upon further request from this Headquarters.

- (5) In these as in the Civil Service Commission enquiries, opinions of members of the Force should not be included in reports. Any opinions regarding the suitability of an applicant or employee should be public opinion or the opinion of persons interviewed. Reports should be confined, insofar as is possible, to facts and not personal opinions.

The emphasis at this time was on developing information which would show whether the applicant or a member of his immediate family was in any way involved in either the Communist or Fascist movement.

Less than a year later this policy was modified in recognition of the security risk presented by persons with character weaknesses. The amended instruction read in part:

While emphasis is placed on security, information as to character as affected by morals, civic and domestic responsibilities, weaknesses such as narcotic addition or chronic alcoholism and indiscretion all have a direct bearing on security and should not be lost sight of. No hard and fast rule can be laid down in the manner in which the latter enquiries are to be carried out, however, whatever line of investigation is pursued all possible discretion should be employed in order to obviate any adverse criticism of the Force generally and the investigator in particular.

Experience gained through conducting these enquiries during the following years, together with evidence that the Soviet Bloc Intelligence Services were placing increasing emphasis on the recruitment of agents through exploitation of character weaknesses, brought about a gradual change in the

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attitude of the Force toward the objective of a field investigation. Since results show conclusively that field investigations seldom produce information of a subversive nature which is not already available in our subversive indices efforts are being made to place more emphasis on the development of information relating to the character of the applicant and his family. This is detailed in an instruction issued on November 9, 1962, attached hereto as Appendix "E".

The R.C.M.P., in attempting to evolve a type of field investigation within the limits of its resources which will provide efficient and effective security screening, has taken cognizance of the special requirements of some foreign and domestic departments and agencies and Canada's NATO commitments. As a result there is no single policy which embodies the procedures to be followed in conducting a field investigation, but a series of policy instructions designed to meet individual requirements. To illustrate: in 1959 the R.C.M.P. discontinued neighbourhood enquiries in security screening cases because the results generally were unproductive and character information was available from other sources, such as local police and employment records. However, to prevent any gap in security screening increased emphasis was placed on credit rating checks and interviews with fellow employees and supervisors. Neighbourhood enquiries are still carried out on requests received [REDACTED] and for

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"Top Secret" and "Special Assignment" clearance. In addition, although most field investigations cover the applicant's background for the preceding 10 years, some positions require coverage for the preceding 20 years, and one agency requires coverage for the preceding 15 years. These and other variations have increased the administrative and investigative work-load of the Branch.

GROWTH OF SECURITY SCREENING:

(1) INCREASES IN REQUESTS FOR SECURITY SCREENING:

Appendices "F", "G" and "H" provide a statistical summary of the growth of security screening since the inception of the co-ordinated programme in 1946. Of the total number of requests processed during this period, approximately 45% have been in relation to security screening of prospective immigrants and sponsors; 15% in relation to citizenship applicants; and 10% in relation to U.S. visa applicants. The remaining 30% have been requests for security screening for Canadian and foreign government employment.

The figures indicate that during the past five years total requests for security screening have levelled off at an average of 250,000 annually. A corresponding trend is reflected by each of the six components of the overall total. During a fifteen year period the number of departments and agencies for whom security screening is carried out has increased from thirty-three in 1947 to eighty-nine in 1962.

(2) INCREASES IN "A" BRANCH PERSONNEL:

Numerically the strength of the Branch has increased more than three-fold since 1949, as may be determined from the following tabulation:

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1948 - no figure available	1956 - 36
1949 - 12	1957 - 39
1950 - 12	1958 - 41
1951 - 20	1959 - 42
1952 - 33	1960 - 42
1953 - 38	1961 - 41
1954 - 42	1962 - 44
1955 - 43	1963 - 43

A comparison of the above figures with those in Appendix "F" suggests that the manpower of the Branch has remained relatively constant with the number of requests being received, except for the fiscal years ending in 1957 and 1958 when immigration requests were exceptionally high, due in part to the results of the Hungarian uprising.

To meet the demands of security screening of prospective immigrants the number of members serving overseas at Visa Control Posts has increased from nine in 1947 to eighteen in 1949 to thirty-one in 1963.

CHANGES IN BRANCH ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES
DESIGNED TO INCREASE EFFECTIVENESS OF SECURITY
SCREENING

The statistics mentioned under^{the} last heading, ^{corr}~~cor~~relating the manpower of the Branch with the volume of work, do not indicate the gradual changes which have been effected, particularly during the past five years, to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of security screening. Since 1958 ten members of the Branch have gradually become permanently engaged in specialized or support tasks relating to the operations of the Branch.

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Two members are now employed full-time assisting the Senior N.C.C. of the Branch in administrative and policy matters. In the past these functions were performed by members of the various Sections, however as the functions to be performed gradually increased in number and complexity they became a disruptive influence on the operations of the Branch as a whole. The transfer of responsibility for all administrative matters to one member and for all major policy matters to one other member, under the direction of the Senior N.C.C., has promoted the operation of the Branch in a more efficient and unified manner.

In 1959 it became necessary to establish a new Section in the Branch for the administration of security cases involving major character weaknesses, particularly homosexuality. This was precipitated by an attempt of the Russian Intelligence Service to recruit a Canadian government employee through threat of exposure of his homosexual activities. In 1960 the volume of work being handled by this Section necessitated the addition of another member. However, since that time the Directorate has been unable to obtain Security Panel approval of terms of reference for the successful continuance of the investigation with the result that the volume of work diminished in 1962.

In January 1962, four experienced members were selected from the various Sections of the Branch to form a [REDACTED] Section to handle the preparation of all replies to requests for security screening in which adverse information

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is developed. Previously, adverse reports were prepared by each of the members in the Branch, resulting in criticism being received over the lack of uniformity in the briefs which were forwarded to the requesting departments. The products of this relatively new Section have overcome the criticism which was being received but the additional time and effort which is being put into producing a much improved brief has made it necessary to add two more members to the Section. The function being performed by this Section is of prime importance to the operations of the Branch and the addition of one or two experienced members is urgently required to meet current commitments and to reduce the back-log of about one hundred cases which developed during the last fiscal year.

The work load of Branch personnel processing the bulk of requests for security screening has been increased not only by the loss of the services of the ten members mentioned above but also by two changes in procedures effected during the past two years. As previously indicated, in 1961 the forwarding of copies of field investigation reports to seven departments and agencies was replaced by the submission of summaries prepared by members of the Branch from the results of field investigations. This has been found to be an exacting and time-consuming, but necessary procedure. A second modification, introduced in 1962, was designed to permit the Branch to provide more complete direction for the field investigation. This entailed a more thorough examination of each case in

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the initial stage to determine what areas of investigation would likely be the most productive. This innovation has been only partially successful in that the volume of work to be handled by the present staff of the Branch precludes any examination of each case in depth.

Since its formation in 1946 this Branch has been staffed by no more than sufficient personnel to process security screening requests in a routine manner, and on many occasions the numerical strength has dropped well below this minimum requirement. Consequently the Branch has been unable to undertake any extended review of its policies and procedures or to prepare any long-range plans for a more unified and improved security screening operation. Any modifications which have been introduced or changes which have been proposed have been designed, of necessity, to meet immediate needs. For example, late in 1962 the Branch proposed that the submission of summaries of the results of favourable field investigations to only seven government departments and agencies should be discontinued. The proposal was based on two arguments. First, the time spent in preparing these summaries could be used to better advantage if applied to improving the direction and supervision of field investigations. Secondly, in providing these few departments with summaries the Branch was extending its services beyond the limits of security screening and entering into the field of personnel selection. The Branch was, and still is, of the opinion that its

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responsibilities, under the terms of Cabinet Directive #29, can be met by providing a requesting department with a short statement to the effect that enquiries disclosed nothing to the detriment of the applicant or employee. Although this system has been used with the majority of departments and agencies since 1948 the Security Panel did not agree with the proposal.

CONCLUSION:

Because security screening is a preventive measure no positive estimate of its effectiveness can be made. In fact, to quote from Cabinet Directive #4, "It is open to doubt whether the activities of any persons named by the recent Royal Commission would have been discovered by any conceivable system of screening". However, Appendix "H" shows that security screening has been productive and, lacking evidence to the contrary, it may be assumed that the procedures followed during the past sixteen years have been reasonably effective.

Since no security screening system will be foolproof there is always room for improvement. The knowledge gained through experience since 1946 has illustrated the need for a constant review and modification of the policies and procedures which are in effect at any given time. Subject to the limitations imposed by a continuing shortage of man power and with a constant awareness of the embarrassment and danger of undue public criticism, the Branch has introduced over the years

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procedural changes which have helped to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of security screening. Indeed, the policies and procedures now being followed in Canada are considered superior to those being practiced in either the United Kingdom or the United States.

OTTAWA
13-6-63

APPENDIX "A" Cabinet Directive - Circular # 4 (5-3-48)
" " " " " # 4A (6-4-48)
" " " " " # 24 (16-10-52)
" " " " " # 29 (21-12-55)
" " " " " 14-12-60
" "D" Supp. Memo to Security Officers
" "E" Policy Instruction Lha. 562 9-11-62
" "F" } Statistics
" "G" }
" "H" }

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