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For Superintendents,
Directors and H.Q. Staff
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E S P I O N A G E

DIRECTORATE OF SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE

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DEFENCE RESEARCH BOARD
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1. In view of defence preparations in Canada and for the reason that Canada is rapidly occupying a position of greater world importance, it must be assumed that the U.S.S.R. and her satellites are extending their Canadian intelligence networks.

2. The Defence Research Board is a prime target because scientific intelligence is probably of more value to Russia than political, economic or military intelligence. With increasing Canadian/US/UK co-operation in military research and development, intelligence penetration of DRB becomes of increased value to the Russians. Further, if for any reason we should prove easier to penetrate than similar UK or US bodies an even greater espionage effort would undoubtedly be directed at DRB.

No. 3. Russia maintains a gigantic intelligence processing machine which feeds interpreted information to every phase of Soviet organization and industry. No item of information is too small, and their agents collect all the raw data they can obtain. Generally speaking, all information is considered of equal importance at the collecting level and we must therefore not make the mistake of assuming that attention will not be paid to projects of relatively low security classification.

4. Sources of intelligence are divided into two categories, those "conscious" and those "unconscious". By this is meant that the source either is or is not aware that he is giving information to a foreign power. The unconscious source is the type who may make the mistake of discussing his work with another, believing he is giving information only to a friend. Individuals whose discretion in this respect is questionable are always a potential danger and should not be employed on classified work. The desire to discuss one's work is a normal human characteristic but must be curbed by an understanding of the risk.

5. What motivates sources to give information consciously? The basic causes may lie in fanatic idealism, antagonistic ideology or inherent misanthropy (the malcontent), but bribery or blackmail may also be a large influence. The mental idiosyncrasies of the dangerous idealist, ideologist and malcontent as well as those of the person predisposed to accepting a bribe are often evident under close observance of the individual, but the man or woman who spies only because of fear (e.g. blackmail) may be extremely difficult to recognize. Of course, having close relatives behind the Iron Curtain, makes any one a poor security risk and such persons normally are not employed by DRB. But the employee who, perhaps through some minor indiscretion, has been lead under threat to greater indiscretions can, through fear of exposure and disgrace, become a full fledged spy.

6. Although employees of DRB are "cleared" so far as possible, it must never be assumed that a security investigation and clearance is positive and complete evidence of trustworthiness. The odds against hiring a spy are greatly increased by security investigations but some will still gain entrance and some persons may be suborned after employment.

7. Superintendents, in addition to taking routine physical security measures, should constantly be aware of this situation and carefully assess the personalities of each individual under their jurisdiction. The motivations listed below, while not necessarily all-inclusive, may be of value as a guide.

- (a) Political } Any evidence of discordant
(b) Religious } or antagonistic ideologies;
(c) Racial } any evidence of fanaticism.
- (d) Financial - any unexplainable affluence
- (e) Prejudice } Any evidence of serious
(f) Spite } maladjustment in personal
(g) Vanity } characteristics as exhibited
in relationship with other
employees.
- (h) Fear - any inordinate reticence
regarding outside activities
may be indicative but usually
if there is any indication at
all it will be the sense that
the person is working with
inward strain or worry. Sexual
aberrations, alcoholism and drug
addiction all render people more
vulnerable to blackmail, as does
a criminal record which the
individual believes is unknown
to his employers.

8. In addition to the above assessment, Superintendents should:

- (a) Carefully check their lists of classified projects and remove any one of doubtful reliability from classified work.
- (b) On highly classified projects utilize personnel in whose integrity there is the highest confidence.
- (c) Recheck the distribution of classified information within the establishment to ensure that only those with a real "need-to-know" have access to any item of classified information and that this requirement does NOT provide access to classified information which they do NOT require.
- (d) Ensure that all concerned are kept impressed with the importance of not talking about their work either to those unconnected with it inside the establishment or, of course, to any one unconnected with it outside.
- (e) Maintain careful but unobtrusive watch for any signs of lack of reliability of staff, or undue interest in secret projects by personnel not really concerned.

9. Finally, it is clearly prudent for each Superintendent to assume that there may be at least one "agent" in his establishment and to endeavour, by a process of careful elimination, to narrow the field of possibilities in a constant effort to identify subversive elements. Should the Superintendent become suspicious - that is, that he somehow places doubt on an individual - he should at once take up the matter of his suspicions with the DRB Security Officer - no one else. Under no circumstances should the person in question be allowed to become suspicious of his doubts.