

Mr. Wall

CONFIDENTIAL

J-1-1

SEEN BY THE
PRIME MINISTER

October 16th, 1964.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

Mr. Orlikow's motion on security directives

In your memorandum of September 28th you asked for a report on some of the points made by Mr. Donald Macdonald concerning the debate on the Orlikow motion. Attached is a memorandum that Mr. Wall prepared for me, going into the whole matter quite fully.

You will, I think, recall the discussion there was in your office on June 23rd to review the question whether the directive on security could not be made public. It was agreed at that time that, much as we would all have liked to be in a position to do it, publication would simply lead to a new round of questions that definitely could not be answered.

The next stage was the one Mr. Macdonald refers to when Mr. Brewin raised the question of a compromise of some kind. There were two possibilities:

- (a) to table a part of the original directive which would set forth the procedure only (and not the related material that goes into the question of the kind of associations that are considered to indicate doubtful loyalty, etc.); or
- (b) to have a new directive put out to include the procedure only and table that in full.

*Discussed with
RGR 10/29/64.
agrd he shd keep DSM
fully informed on security
policy matters.
JW*

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- 2 -

I went into these possibilities with care with all the people involved in the security arrangements (not just the R.C.M.P.) and we all came to the conclusion that neither course would help. To table a part of a directive would certainly lead to questions as to what the rest contained that could not be tabled. A new directive on procedure would obviously be incomplete unless questions were answered as to just what certain terms meant or what definition was to be given to certain relationships or associations. Apart from these difficulties, there was a problem of principle and precedent. Once the government had returned a security directive, it would be extremely difficult to resist future demands. I should perhaps have taken this matter up with you but it seemed to me that the original decision in the meeting on June 23rd really covered the substance of the matter. In any event, I must say I cannot see in retrospect that it would have been possible to follow any course of action that would have involved less difficulty than the one that was followed.

I think the real lesson to be learned from this is the one Mr. Wall suggests - namely that we must do a much better job of briefing and preparing Parliamentary Assistants who may have to handle a delicate question like this. Against the possibility that this kind of question might arise again, it might be well to have Mr. Wall and perhaps the R.C.M.P. take Mr. Macdonald very fully into the whole security matter, so that he will be well versed and prepared in future. Do you think we should do this?

*I would be
puzzled if
you would
do this*

SEEN BY THE
PRIME MINISTER



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