

S-1-10

d
r
a

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

S E C R E T

MEMORANDUM TO SECURITY OFFICERS

Security Education

Consideration has been given over the past two years by national security authorities, by the NATO Special Committee and by the NATO Security Committee to the feasibility of providing to security officers information drawn from cases of espionage or attempted subversion from which lessons might be learned with a view to bettering security procedures and attitudes and, it would be hoped, thereby reducing the threat to security by a more general awareness of the extent and nature of the activity of foreign intelligence services directed against NATO itself and against the national interest of member nations. An exchange of case information between member nations of NATO has begun and reports thought to be of interest to security officers, some of whom may already have received the material through other channels, are attached to this memorandum for the information of departmental security officers and for such others within departments and agencies as the security officers consider might benefit by seeing the material.

2. In the view of the NATO Special Committee, "Soviet bloc intelligence operations are constant and unremitting in every NATO country and have not decreased in sympathy with lessening in political tension." Further, "... the efforts of the Soviet bloc intelligence services are directed at the whole range of activities in any way connected with national defence and extend to almost every facet of national life", including the economic, industrial, scientific and technical spheres as well as the intelligence and security services of the NATO countries.

3. One aspect of the Soviet bloc intelligence services effort of particular interest to security staff is the view of the NATO Special Committee that "a considerable portion of the missions given to Soviet bloc agents are concerned with identifying suitable candidates for

/ 2

009111

AGC-1169_0001

recruitment, ascertaining the prospects of recruiting them, and in general with the furthering and planning of other operations. Agents are told to look out for persons with weaknesses, such as excessive drinking and homosexual tendencies, which can be exploited.....". At the same time, it was noted by the Committee that "most Soviet bloc agents in Western countries spy for mercenary reasons. The 'ideological spy' is less common, mainly because improved security standards have removed communists and communist sympathizers from positions giving access to classified information." The Committee also noted that, while "blackmail and other forms of pressure are used as a basis mostly in Soviet bloc countries....." some categories of person, such as emigres from Iron Curtain countries, are subjected to coercion in NATO countries and that, although "..... it is clear that the Soviet bloc intelligence services look for their agents in all walks of life", it is interesting to note that journalists and students are two categories of persons which appear to be of particular interest as potential recruits.

4. While there are a variety of interesting lessons to be learned from the appended case material, one of the most important concerns the need for adequate departmental procedures to ensure, as far as this can be done, that individuals who have access to classified information are in fact reliable persons, particularly in view of the continuing efforts of the Soviet bloc intelligence services to identify and exploit those who are either not reliable for reasons of personal weaknesses, or can be coerced as a result of threats against relatives, or who, through straitened economic circumstances, can be bought. Pertinent extracts from several NATO documents concerning the types of persons of interest to foreign intelligence services and the methods of recruitment known to be in use are appended to this memorandum.

5. At the request of the R.C.M. Police, security officers were reminded in a memorandum dated March 1st, 1962, that officials of Soviet bloc missions may attempt to cultivate the acquaintance of government employees with a view to selecting potential recruits after assessing

/ 3

the individual's reliability and weaknesses to their own satisfaction. Attached to this memorandum are some case histories of attempted recruitment of Canadians in Canada. It should be of interest to departmental and agency security officers to note that, while the Canadian cases may differ in detail from those reported by the twelve contributing NATO countries, they do fall within the general pattern observed by the NATO Special Committee, and do indicate that we have no reason to believe that we derive any protection by a greater geographical separation from the Soviet bloc countries than does the German Federal Republic or the United Kingdom. It has been said by the NATO Special Committee that "... experience suggests that hostile intelligence services are unlikely to use methods in their approach to NATO targets different to those used in attacking national targets.", and it appears to be reasonable to assume that the reverse will also be true.

6. Security officers are requested to consider what advantage might be gained from circulation of this memorandum and the illustrative case material in the attachments at appropriate levels within their department or agency. In considering distribution within a department or agency, the attention of the security officers is directed to the NATO security classification given to some of the appendices. Further distribution of such material should be governed by NATO procedures which are set out in the attachment to a memorandum to security officers entitled "Revised NATO Security Regulations", and dated August 4th, 1955. The title of the attachment to the memorandum is "Canadian Procedures for Handling NATO Documents".

D. Beavis,
Secretary of the Security Sub-Panel.

Privy Council Office,
Ottawa, May th, 1962.