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Terms of Reference

The Commissioner approved a Feasibility Study for the Security Service on 24-11-71 and the Director General set out the following terms of reference on 4-1-72:

Objectives

- (1) To analyze the current operating and administrative procedures and policies and the organizational structure of the Security Service.
- (2) To identify projects and/or systems used within the Security Service which are capable of automation.
- (3) To identify systems areas within the Security Service which should remain as manual systems, but which may or may not require further detailed analysis.

Area of Investigation

All branches and sections of the Security Service in "HQ" and field divisions should be examined in sufficient detail to accomplish the stated objectives. The study should be extended to include the Security Service component of Records Management at "HQ".

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APPENDIX 1

APPENDIX 1

- **Introduction**
- **Summary of Major Recommendations**
- **Summary of General Recommendations**
- **Necessity of a System Philosophy**

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INTRODUCTION

In 1971 it became apparent to Management of the Security Service that computer resources were required to cope with its retrieval and analytical demands. Thus, the Feasibility Study Team was set up, in January 1972, to determine a practical approach to meet the needs of the Service. In addition to studying potential computer areas, the Team was authorized to study organization and general systems and procedures.

The organization facet was turned over to an "Organization Study Team" formed under the auspices of the Bureau of Management Consulting as a prelude to "classification". Because of the inevitable overlap, the report of the Team's findings on organization were turned over to and will be a part of the Bureau of Management Consulting report.

Many general systems improvements have been recommended to Branch Heads and in numerous cases have been implemented. However, they are reiterated for record purposes in the appendix on General Recommendations.

Interviews with personnel from all sectors of the Security Service and other agencies provided the team with an excellent appreciation of the Security Service. Generally speaking, the team split into three factions, namely,

- 1) Operational - Insp. C. Yule and C/M K. Burnett

- 2) Records Management and Administration -
S/Sgt. R. Steg
- 3) Records and Name Index Statistics -
Sgt. Oosthoek and Sgt. W. Gillessie

Following the interviews the team analyzed the material gathered and prepared this report with attached appendices.


The philosophy of the systems proposed has been one of practicality and simplicity rather than optimization with a resultant complexity.

It is important to note that without the assistance of all branch and division officers and their personnel, this study could not have been done in its entirety. The usefulness of the study can be measured by reviewing the organization and systems being utilized in 1980.

Justification of a computer is based on the need for a Generalized Search System, specialized indices (name etc.) and future communications utilizing a computer. However, because of lack of quantitative data, some of the systems need a value judgement as to their desirability. These judgements should be made with foresight rather than hindsight. The need for a computer is implicit in acceptance of the recommendations contained in this report.

The generalized search approach for which a Data Base has been designed for the counter subversive branches, "D" & "G", was generally accepted by all levels across the Security Service. Thus, this being so, it will be possible

Fig-3



DATA GROUPING Headline or first line of text

This is where common data is grouped thus saving fragmentation by different branches, etc. Therefore, although it is proposed that each branch will be primarily responsible for its own projects by secondment of personnel under the guidance of the Data Processing Branch, certain standards will have to be followed. Figure 3 illustrates an example of such a grouping accessible with justified constraints by any member of the Service. Thus each project would first look at common data and input methods before designing a separate data base.

Without a common method each branch sets up indexes based only upon its own needs. For example, "A" has an index of sex deviates, "I" has indexes on names and addresses, Staffing has information on security clearances and so does Internal Security.

If information is updated to one master data record, all indexes are modified with the same data automatically and therefore there will not be discrepancies. Thus, a big advantage is that common reports can be produced from the master record, for example, Photo Albums, and Management would know that all users had the same information.

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APPENDIX 2


APPENDIX 2

**- Summary of Functions Within
Security Service**

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This section gives only a brief exposure to functions in the Security Service. During the time of the visits and the present, changes have occurred which may not be reflected in this report. Also, for a more in depth overview of the branches' functions, the interviews with section personnel are recorded in working papers held by the Officer i/c Data Processing.



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"A" OPERATIONS

In compliance with government directives, reciprocal agreements with friendly foreign and domestic agencies, this branch is responsible for all security screening, including Citizenship applications, Certificate of Identity and Visas.

To meet this objective, the branch is functionally structured as follows:

1) Government Personnel Screening

All domestic government screening requests (Confidential, Secret, Top Secret and S.A.) on government employees are co-ordinated. This entails examining records and files, co-ordinating field investigations when required and replying to the request.

2) Foreign Screening

This section performs the same function as above with the addition of correlating requests and conducting investigations when required on Citizenship applications, Certificates of Identity and Visas.

3) RCMP Personnel Screening

A similar function as government personnel and foreign screening is performed except it is in regard to members of and applicants

for the Force.

In addition, the branch has the following support areas to its Screening sections:

a) Special Character Advisers

These are responsible for all investigations dealing with deviates.

b) Briefing Section

This section is responsible for analyzing files and preparing factual briefs to the appropriate department on the file subject if the information on him or her is either subversive in nature or a character defect.

c) Cross Reference Section

Initial trace files located by Records Management are reviewed by Security Service members in this section to establish whether they are positive traces. If they are, the files are passed to the appropriate section in the branch for briefing or determining that no brief is required.

d) "C" Section

Members of this section are responsible for maintaining and developing statistical data to measure the overall effectiveness and capability of the section. Also they

co-ordinate Credit Bureau checks, edit
manhour reports and carry out miscellaneous
administrative functions.

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APPENDIX 3


APPENDIX 3

- **Conceptual Computer Systems**
- **Proposed Plan**
- **Computer Configuration**

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Fig -13



(8) NAME - CTC - PASSPORT INDEXES - Computerization of names, etc. into specialized indexes (Fig. 13) as a by-product of updating the data base of operational files is recommended for the following reasons.

- a) It enables all names, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] to be available in one central area. The advantage of this, of course, is in the fact that one can get a response via a terminal in one minute as opposed to a time lag of up to 3 days in waiting for Records Management to check out the cardveyors. Therefore, desk officers can go to a terminal rather than completing a form and submitting it to Records Management.
- b) Efficiency is improved since a machine is not prone to a mental state or fatigue such as humans are. In some cases, records have (hearsay) returned negative responses when it was known a subject reference existed.
- c) PHF's could go direct to an "A" Operations x-reference section to immediately determine if a brief is required. This saves Records Management checking out the names, drawing

the files and passing them to the x-reference section. This section, of course, could be made up of existing name searchers trained to scan a response to determine if a brief is required.

- d) The 30,000 cards held by "A" Operations on Special Characters could be dispensed with and character reference checks carried out by the x-reference section mentioned in (c) above.
- e) Cursory checks are made over the telephone and these are dangerous. Using a terminal would ensure a more thorough check had been conducted. This could be from a desk in the x-reference section of "A" Operations where all phone enquiries could be directed. This would save at least one man year of time spent by various members going back and forth to Name Index. Integrated with this desk could be a method of following up where PHF's were not received subsequent to a phone check.
- f) A name search technique is available from either CPIC or [REDACTED] These have been

reviewed in the context of the Security Service requirements and CPIC has been assessed as being satisfactory from a name grouping point of view but not as suitable as the [REDACTED] technique. Therefore, a combination of both would be desirable. This combination could then be modified to suit the Service.

- g) An on-line computer retrieval at desk level could be the first step in the communication system conceptualized in recommendation (9).
- h) A damage log can be generated every time an enquirer had a positive response. This log is explained more fully under recommendation (10).


DEVIATE ANALYSIS

8) There are 30,000 deviates or suspected deviates in "A" Operations index. However, there is no analysis of these individuals. Therefore, when the names are computerized, it is recommended that, yearly, an analysis be conducted on such things as:

- a) concentrations by department;
- b) changes from previous years;
- c) background profiles.

This is considered useful to predict potential areas of concern and potential security risks.

Fig-24



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APPENDIX 4

**- Recommendations Regarding General
Systems and Procedures**

APPENDIX 4

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BRIEFS

10) Consideration should be given to disbanding the brief writing section of "A" Operations and moving this function into the operational branches. At present, at least 25% of all briefs are sent to an operational branch for comment and editing. We consider that it is desirable that a brief reflect, both in fact and comment, the most up-to-date assessment of the consequences of hiring or rejecting a person on whom there is "adverse" traces. These considerations are not always apparent when a single file is reviewed and assessed out of the milieu to which it belongs, and which is only understood by the operational branches.

Other agencies, notably [REDACTED] have given the brief writing responsibility to its most senior and experienced personnel. The Security Service has traditionally given lip service to this concept and in fact, applied a reverse approach. The foregoing approach would put the emphasis where it has traditionally been held it belongs.


A valid argument heard in "A" Operations is that the information in our files is frequently of poor quality because of poor documentation. We are of the opinion that, to an unnecessary degree, this is correct. Making the responsibility for briefing writing a senior function at the operational desk level would go a long way towards correcting this situation. It would also make it possible for the desk

or branch officer to pursue his enquiries and their logical consequences to whatever level is necessary such as Citizenship Committee meetings.

Briefs are written in a stereotyped fashion and one gets the impression, after having read a few, "so what". Therefore, the briefs should be written in a more interesting way and not make them as bulky as they now are. It is a known fact that generally anything greater than two pages is not really read and understood. Why, for instance, tabulate in the brief the meetings attended by the subject? A simple statement that (say) the subject has attended fifteen terrorist meetings in the past five months might be preferable.

Also in "B" Section of "A" Operations a file review is duplicated because the first reviewer does not have briefing experience. Putting the function into the operational branches would give many desk officers the opportunity to prepare same and thus broaden their experience.

Another advantage is in the fact that if "C" Operations reviewed the French files and wrote the briefs, efficiency would be increased and the time lag (up to 7 months) to translate into English would not be necessary. If this is not accepted, then at least a position in "A" Operations should be bilingual and a cadre of professional brief writers be trained in creative writing.



BRANCH & DIVISIONS GENERAL

RECOMMENDATIONS

"A" OPERATIONS

1) Briefs are submitted to Government departments and it is not known whether the subject has been employed or not. Therefore, a return slip should be designed so that a record can be maintained on the subject and thus keep the Security records up to date. This would be desirable in any computerized universal screening system developed. Also, an analysis of the data would indicate whether the problem of ignoring the Service's briefs is common or rare. If common, Management could inform the appropriate management at the government level.

2) Policy should be considered whereby briefs are returned (the PSC do return them) for destruction within a time frame (say 30 days) and a reference entered on the subject's personnel file in the government department indicating there is a trace within the Security Service, or alternatively when a subject leaves the employ of the government it should be returned or a certificate submitted indicating it had been destroyed. The advantage of this is in the fact that the large amount of sensitive data, apparently "readily" available, would not be taken out of context if read at a later date when philosophies have changed. Manpower & Immigration apparently have a considerable number of briefs.

3) If a Security Service system of computerized name checking is approved, this branch should assist in designing a system whereby negative responses to a Personal History Form (PHF) are recorded so that (say) yearly their names are compared to the [REDACTED] to ensure nothing had come to light in the interim. The advantage of this is in the fact that if a potential problem appears, it can be monitored and not left to when the subject's five year clearance is checked. The system could be designed to be a prodder to departments informing them that a new PHF is required because the five year span is nearly up.

4) Government Department Liaison - The Sergeant in this section is utilized mainly in answering telephone enquiries from various government departments for name checks. Approximately 75% of his time is spent in going to and from the [REDACTED] Section of Records Management. It is recommended that this procedure be reviewed with the view of releasing the position by giving the function to the two government sub-sections. (This has been done.)

5) An analysis of deviate concentrations in government could be derived from a data base (say) bi-annually. This would serve management in alerting them to undesirable concentrations and thus security risks in any given department.

6) RCMP Personnel Screening - This section is primarily responsible for the clearing of applicants for the Force including regular members, civilian members, S/Csts. and public servants. While this is a necessary operation, it appears that with the establishment of the Office of Internal Security within the Security Service and the Office of Departmental Security Officer for the rest of the Force, the value of this operation has diminished. Consideration should be given to either splitting it up between the Security Officers, eliminating it, or giving it a more meaningful role.

7) Foreign & Other Police Screening - Problems can be envisioned within this section when classification analyses the duties of the various positions. There is one public servant, one C/M 8, one Cst. and two Cpls. The P.S. position has been rated by Treasury Board and repeated attempts to have it set at a higher level have been unsuccessful. The incumbent is considered to be performing well and carrying at least an equal share of the work load. Classification could easily rate some of the other positions within this section at the same level as that of the public servant, i.e. red circle the members.

8) Administrative Section - The responsibility of this function is mainly of an administrative nature. There is considerable duplication with Admin & Finance and unnecessary duties are being performed in this section. Many of the

records maintained are duplicated in Staffing and Training branches. Consideration should be given to reducing this Section to one Public Servant, who would carry out only the essential duties.

9) Perhaps the branch could prepare a booklet to outline common problems encountered by the branch when reading investigative reports and trying to write a brief. This could be given to investigators attending courses.

10) It is recommended that policy be written to ensure that the officer in charge of the Foreign Service branch annually holds a meeting for each of the Far East and European theatres with VCOs congregating to be up dated regarding the Security Service and its policy.